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Now, as to the evidence, it is competent for the legislature to
declare the rules that shall govern in a contract between parties.
The common law is, that an original deed must be produced, and
its execution proven by witness. The statute is, that it may be
proven by the certificate of acknowledgment. By statute a certified copy of the record may be introduced in evidence if the original is lost.
I have given a very hasty sketch of the questions that may arise
in the examination of an abstract of title. I have not attempted
to demonstrate the simplicity of an examination, but quite the
contrary. And if I have accomplished any good at all it is in exhibiting the difficulties which embarrass the conveyancer. I would
have but little confidence in the opinion of a lawyer who imagined himself competent to solve readily all the problems that
JAMES P. ROOT.
might arise.
CHICAGO, July 9th 1875.
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JAMES W. TOMLINSON v. THE TOWN OF DERBY.
A motion to set aside a verdict for the misconduct of a juror, and a motion for
a new trial for errors in the rulings of the court, can be filed in the Superior
Court at the same time, and can be reserved together for the advice of this court.
Where a juror has conversed with a person not of the panel, respecting the case
on trial, it is sufficient cause for setting aside the verdict, unless it appears that
the successful party in the suit has not been benefited or the defeated party
injured, by the fact of the conversation.
Where a juror allowed such a conversation, in which it was stated to him that
if the plaintiff should recover five thousand dollars damage hc would have
nothing left after paying his expenses, in which the juror expressed his concurrence, it was held, after a verdict for the plaintiff, that the effect of the conversation was presumably to increase the damages allowed, and that the verdict ought
!
to be set aside.
CASE, for an injury from a defective highway of the defendant
town. Verdict for the plaintiff, and motion by the defendant to
set aside the verdict for the misconduct of a juror, with a motion
for a new trial for errors in the charge of the court. The points
decided by this court will be fully understood from the opinion.

Watrous and Wooster, with whom was Torrance, in support of
the motions.

4TOMLINSON v. TOWN OF DERBY.
H. B. Munson and Wrigqht, contra,.
PARt, 0. J.-The plaintiff contends that a motion to set aside
a verdict for the misconduct of a juror, and a motion for a new
trial for errors claimed to have been committed by the court in the
trial of a cause, cannot be made in the same case at the same time,
for the reason that the one precedes and the other follows the
rendition of the judgment. But we think it is not necessary that
judgment should be rendered in order to lay the foundation for
a motion for a new trial. It may or may not.be rendered at the
discretion of the court. In the case of Collins v. Prentice, 15
Conn. 423, the court advised judgment to be rendered nunc pro
tune, after deciding the motion for a new trial against the party
who made it.
In the present case no judgment has been rendered, as appeais
by the record; therefore there is no apparent inconsistency in the
existence of these two motions at the same time in the oase. Indeed, in almost every instance in our reports, a motion to set aside
a verdict for the misconduct of a juror, has been accompanied by
a motion for a new trial for errors claimed to have been committed
by the court. We think there is nothing in this objection. * * *
In regard to the merits of the case, we think it is clear that
the verdict should be set aside and a new trial had. It was an
important question in the case what damages the plaintiff should
recover. One of the jurors impannelled to try the case suffered a
person, other than a juror, to say to him substantially, while the
case was on trial, that if the trial should continue fifteen or twenty
days, and the plaintiff should recover five thousand dollars damages,
he would have nothing left after paying the expenses of the suit.
The juror assented to the statement, and said substantially that he
had learned from a party out of court! during the trial what were
the expenses of running the Superior Court, and expressed his
opinion, derived from information thus obtained, that the costs of
the trial would amount to the sum of five thousand dollars. The
same juror made on another occasion, to another party not a juror,
during the progress of the trial, substantially the same statement,
that if the plaintiff should recover five thousand dollars there
would be nothing left after paying the expenses of the case. The
same juror bad other conversations with other parties not of the
jury, and during the progress of the trial, and to one of them he
narrated the substance of the evidence as far as it had been give-n.
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But there is no need of going further. The first two conversations respecting the damages necessary for the plaintiff to recover,
in order to pay the expenses of the trial, we deem amply sufficient
to set aside the verdict. Since the case of Bennett v. Howard, 3
Day 219, the law of this state has been, that where a juror has
had conversation with a party not of the panel, respecting the case
on trial, it is sufficient cause to set aside the verdict, unless it
appears that the successful party in the suit has not been benefited
by the juror's misconduct, or the losing party injured : 1 Swift's
Digest 775 ; State v. Watkins, 9 Conn. 47; -Pettibonev. Phelps,
13 Conn. 445; Hamilton v. Pease, 38 Conn. 115. The whole
tendency of the misconduct in this case was to benefit the plaintiff
and injure the defendants, and it is highly probable that it operated to enhance the amount of damages the plaintiff recovered.
The motion for a new trial has been virtually abandoned by the
defendants, and the view we have taken of the motion to set aside
the verdict renders it unnecessary to consider it.
The Superior Court is advised to set aside the verdict.
The question here discussed is one of
So too, mere formal irregularities,
importance, and of very considerable like not keeping the jury together over
difliculy. It will not always meet the night, in a trial for misdemeanor, have
practical necessities of jury trials, to at- been held no ground for setting aside
tempt to fix a hard and fast line, by tle verdict. The court say, 'that cirwhich to determine all questions of ir- cumstance standing alone is not suffiregularity or misconduct even, in the cient to vacate the verdict :" Rex v.
jury room, or in the impannetling of Kinnear, 2 B. & Al. 462 ; Statev. Branthe jury. It depends both upon the non, 45 Mo. 329. But in such case the
wrong intent and the actual effect pro- burden is upon the state to show that
the separation of the jury did not affect
duced in regard to correct verdicts.
Thus it has been held by the English the prisoner unfavorably : Philips v.
courts, that, where one man hy mistake Coinmonivealth, 19 Gratt. 485. So if one
sat in the place of another upon the of a panel be taken ill, another may be
jury, in the trial of an action, and this sworn in his place, and the trial begin
was discovered before verdict, that it ele noo : Rex v. Edwards, 4 Taunt. 309.
was g ,il ground for awarding a venire
But where the jury carry into their
de uoco : Dovey v. lobson, 6 Taunt. 460. room and consider improper evidence,
And in Norman v. Beamont, Willes calculated to influence the verdict, it
484, Barnes 453, this was held good cannot stand : Petersdorff Ab. 744 in n.
ground for setting aside a verdict ren- So too if the jury act upon their perdered before the mistake was discovered. sonal knowledge : Anonymous, 1 Salk.
But in 1ill v. Yates, 12 East 229, the 405 ; 7 Mod. 3 ; Darrance v. Presto,,
rourt, on fall consideration, held such 18 Iowa 396. Any juror, having any
a mistake no sufficient reason for setting evidence to communicate, should ask
aside a verdir, as it might involve the to have the panel brougut into court.
entire hu~iness of a term.
and himself be sworn, that lie may tesVOL. XXIII.-69
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municated the verdict to those not of the
jury, before it is rendered in court.
This may sometimes be effected by improper inquiries of a juror, while he is
off his guard, after the jury have agreed
upon and sealed up their verdict, but before rendering it in court. In such
cases the proper course might be to
punish the interrogator for his contempt
of court, and admonish the juror for his
want of proper reserve. But if the
verdict is reconsidered after the communication it cannot stand: Martin v.
Morelock, 32 Ill. 485.
Where new trials are sought because
the jurors have'been allowed to commisdemeanor: Lord MANSFIELD, C. J.,
in Vaise v. Delaval, spra;Fir v. Hor- municate with outsiders, in such mandy, T. Jones 83. And all such verdicts ner that it may have influenced the vermust be set aside, of course: Thompson dict, the rule is uniform to set aside the
verdict, and also to punish all offenders
v. Perkins, 26 Iowa 486.
But where courts are asked to set for the contempt who have acted deaside a verdict, on the ground of mis- signedly : Davidsonv. Manlove, 2 Cold.
(Tenn.) 346. Cole v. Swan, 4 Greene
conduct of the jury, or of improper in(Iowa) 32. Where the communication
fluences brought to bear upon them,
there should be some degree of watch- to the jury is made by an officer of the
fulness exercised, to learn that this is court it should meet condign punishnot a device of the party against whom ment, and the verdict be set aside:
the verdict is rendered, in order to ena- Thomas v. Chapman, 45 Barb. 98.
The cases differ somewhat as to the
ble him to have a double advantage, by
first taking the chance of obtaining a presumption the court will make in reverdict in his favor, and failing in that, gard to the verdict being affected by
to obtain a new trial, by such reserved improper communications with the jury.
Hence courts have held Some cases are so liberal as to hold that
exception.
parties with great strictness to the duty it must appear that the misconduct of
of bringing all irregularities of the jury, the jury probably did affect the verdict :
which come to their knowledge before .ledler v. State, 26 Ind. 171 ; Erwin v.
the verdict, at once to that of the court, Bulla, 29 Id. 95; 41 Miss. 291 ; Sexunder penalty of forfeiting all benefit ton v. Lelierrre, 4 Cold. 11. But more
from them: Fessenden v. Sager, 53 Me. commonly the courts require the party
in whose favor the verdict is, when it is
3. But see 40 Vt. 363; 13 Conn.
453; 20 Id. 241, where this question shown the jury were subjected to outside influences,'to show, in a very satis extensively discussed.
And there are no doubt many cases isfictory manner, in order to retain his
where the jury have been guilty of an verdict, that it was not in fact thereby
unintentional irregularity, that the court influenced: Bank v. Fulmer, 2 Vroom
will produce more perfect justice by al- 52 ; Springer v. State, 34 Ga. 379. It
lowing the verdict to stand, if there is is sufficient if it appear that the misno ground for supposing it could have conduct might have influenced the verbeen influenced by such irregularity; as dict: Johnson v. Root, 2 Cliff. 108;
where a juror has, inadvertently, com- Heiser v. Van Dyke, 27 Iowa 359. But

tif'y, in open court, before counsel : Id.
And if the jury resort to the lot to determine the case the verdict will be set'
aside, although in fact rendered according to the right of the case : Hale v.
Cove, 1 Strange 642; Foy v. Harder, 3
Keb. 805. But such misconduct cannot be shown by the affidavit of a juror:
Vaise v. Ddaval, 1 T. R. 11 ; Owen v.
Warburton, 4 B. & P. N. R. 329; Straker
v. Graham, 1 Dow P. C. 223; Hager v.
gager, 38 Barb. 92. But all such proceedings by juries, where shown by
proper evidence, as of the officer attending, will be regarded as a high
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unquestionably it must appear that any pense, while kept together, as nearly as
outside communication with the jury, in practicable, the same as if not impanordcr to vitiate the verdict, was natu- nelled, the money is wisely expended,
rally and reasonably calculated to have and they may thus be kept in good mood
some effect upon the verdict. Mere ba- for an agreement, and will more
dinage would not vitiate a verdict : Peo- commonly come to a satisfactory agreeple v. Boggs, 20 Calif. 432. But see ment, after being kept out, sometimes,
State v. Andrews, 29 Conn. 100. Any even for two days or more; but it' made
subterfuge resorted to by the jury will unhappy by severity at the hand., of
vitiate the verdict, as making a sworn the court, in ever so short a time, there
agreement and sealing it up, in order to is not the least benefit in keeping them
separate and then reconsidering when together, another moment, with any
they come together again : Short v. view to obtain a verdict. Tlhcjudgc who
believes he can drive a jury to agree,
West, 30 Ind. 367.
It seems well settled, that where the will find himself laboring under a very
jury are allowed to have intoxicating serious mistake. It is one of the most
liquors in their room for the common important and difficult offices of the
use of the jurors, the verdict will be judge to be able to maintain the patience
set aside: Ryan v. Harrow, 27 Iowa and good nature of the jury until they do
494. But we could not recommend agree. There is no one mode in which
anything like extreme self-denial, to be the administration of justicesuffers more
inflicted upon a jury, in order to induce serious detrimcnt, than in dismissing
an agreement. It will naturally pro- juries because they think they will not
duce the opposite effect. Our own ex- be able to agree. We think it should
perience has established, beyond all never be done unless from the clearest
I. F. R.
question, that, where the jury are al- necessity.
lowed food and sleep at the public ex-

Supreme Gourt of Vermont.
JOIINSON v.TOWN OF WARBURGIT.
One travelling upon the Sabbath, without excuse, cannot maintain an action
against the town for any damage he may suffer, through defects in its highways.

CASE for injuries received while travelling on a highway within
the defendant town. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of
Ross, J.-The necessity which will excuse one for travelling on
the Sabbath must be a real and not a fancied necessity. The
statute reads : "No person shall travel on the Sabbath or first day
of the week, except from necessity or charity :" Gen. St. ch.
93, sect. 3. It is not an honest belief that a necessity exisis, but
the actualexistence of the necessity, which renders travelling on the
Sabbath lawful.
The jury, under proper instructions, have found, that the travelling of the plaintiff on the occasion when he received his injury
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was not from necessity, and therefore unlawful. They have also
found, that he has suffered damage from injuries received by reason of the insufficiency of a highway which it was the duty of the
town to keep in good and sufficient repair. On this verdict the
defendant moved for judgment in its favor, which the court below
proforma overruled and rendered judgment for the plaintiff against
the exception of the defendants. Thus the question is distinctly
presented for decision, whether a town is liable for damages sustained through the insufficiency of a highway which it is legally
bound to keep in repair, to one who is unlawfully travelling on
such highway or travelling on the Sabbath without a legal excuse.
The question is not whether the plaintiff is barred from recovering
damages, which he would otherwise be entitled'to recover, because
he was at the time he received the injury committing an unlawful
act, or travelling at an unlawful rate of speed, but, whether the
town was under a legal duty to furnish him a safe highway to
travel over, when at that precise time he was forbidden by law to
travel over the highway?
This precise question is now for the first time presented to this
court for decision. In Abbott v. Walcott, 38 Vt. 666, a question
somewhat analogous was decided. The plaintiff in that case was
injured from the springing of a bridge while he was trotting his
horse upon it. The bridge -was of such construction that, by law,
the plaintiff was forbidden to drive faster than a walk thereon.
The plAintiff might lawfully travel on the bridge, but not at the
rate of speed he used. It was held, he could not recover. The
decision is put upon two grounds. First, that the plaintiff's illegal
act in driving faster than a walk must have contributed to the
springing of the bridge, and so contributed to the h'appening of the
accident which caused the injury. Second, if this was not so, that
inasmuch as it-was conceded that "the bridge was good and sufficient except in the matter of its springing when driven upon on
the trot," and as the plaintiff had no right to use it in that manner,
the town was under no legal obligation to provide a bridge for
such use ; in other words, that the town had fully discharged its
duty towards the plaintiff, in that it had provided as good a bridge
as the law required, and that the accident happened, and the injury was occasioned, by the unlawful act of the plaintiff, or of one
Carlysle who was at the time also trotting his horse on the bridge,
and not from any failure of the town to discharge its duty in the
premises.
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The question at bar has arisen in other states, but the courts
of tho.-e -tates have not been so fortunate as to arrive at the
same -olution of it. The courts of Massachusetts and Maine have
repeatedly decided that a plaintiff could not recover under such
circumstances: Jones v. Andover, 10 Allen IS ; Bosworth v.
Swanzey, 10 Metc. 353; ITnckley v. Penobscot, 42 Me. 89 ; Bryant v. BiddJord, 59 Me. 193. In some of the other states, it has
been held that the fact that the plaintiff was travelling on the
Sabbath in violation of law, did not relieve the town from its liability for damages sustained through the insufficiency of its highway. So far as I have had access to such decisions, they assume
that the town was liable to the plaintiff for the insufficiency of its
highway, and proceed to consider whether the unlawful act of the
plaintiff relieved the town from such liability. Sutton v. TJrannotosa, 29 Wis. 21, is one of the latest decided cases of this kind,
and one on which the plaintiff especially relics. It therefore
demands some consideration. In the opinion which was delivered
by C. J. DIxoN, very many of the cases are reviewed. It assumes that the decision of the cases against the right of the plaintiff to recover, rests either upon the ground that the plaintiff's
illegal act of travelling on the Sabbath contributed to the happening of the accident, and for that reason deprived him of the right
of recovery, or, that the fact, that he was engaged in an unlawful
act at the time he received the injury, bars his right of action.
Both of these grounds are combated earnestly, and I think successfully.
It is difficult to maintain that the traveller's illegal act, in such
cases, contributed to the happening of the accident. The insufficiency of the highway remaining the same, and the traveller being
at the place of the insufficiency under the same circumstances, on
any other day of the week, the same accident and injury would
have befallen him. A contributory cause is one which under the
same circumstances would always be an element aiding in the
production of the accident. The fict that the traveller is unlawfully at the place of the accident does not contribute to the overturn of his carriage, or to the production of the accident. The
same forces and causes would have overturned the carriage or
caused the accident as well on a week-day as on the Sabbath, as
well when the traveller was lawfully at the place of the accident
as when unlawfully there. It is sometimes asserted that if the
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injured party had not been unlawfully travelling he would not
have been at the place of insufficiency and would not have received the injury. The same is true of all injuries on highways.
The injured person must be present at the place of the accident in
order to receive the injury, whether he is lawfully or unlawfully
there, when there. The same causes and forces produce the accident in the one as in the other case; and the fact that the injured
one is present unlawfully is not a factor which contributes to the
happening of the accident. Hence the decisions against the traveller's right of recovery must rest upon some other basis, than
that his unlawful act, or travelling unlawfully, was a contributory
cause to the happening of the accident within the legal meaning
ordinarily attached to those words.
Neither, as I think, can the fact that the party receiving the
injury was at the time of the injury engaged in an unlawful act,
deprive him of the right of recovery. If the plaintiff, at the time
of the injury, had been profaning the name of the Deity, he would
have been engaged in an unlawful act: but no one would hold
that such an act would bar him from recovering of the town if it
were otherwise liable for the injury sustained. The town could
not relieve itself from the consequences of its own wrong or neglect by alleging the illegal act of the plaintiff. Punishments aro
provided for all unlawful acts, but their administration is not committed to the discretion of towns ; neither has a town the right to
add to the prescribed penalty the injuries resulting from its own
wrongful act or neglect. The travelling by the plaintiff without
excuse on the Sabbath was not an offence against the town, and
it cannot excuse its wrong done to him, if wrong it be, by recrimination. The allegation of a wrong done by a plaintiff to a third
party never furnished a defendant a good legal answer for a wrong
done by himself to that plaintiff. Several of the cases cited by
the plaintiff sustain and illustrate this proposition. There may be
cases in which a party injured through the insufficiency of a highway while engaged in an unlawful act, could not recover, and in
which the unlawful act would be the remote cause of his inability
to recover. It may be questionable whether a criminal party,
like a thief, robber or kidnapper, who should be injured while
using a highway in transporting and securing the fruits of his
crime, could recover for such injuries (though occasioned by the
insufficiency of the highway) of the town ordinarily responsible
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for such insufficiency. In all such cases, I apprehend, his unlawful act would not bar the criminal party from sustaining an action
which had once attached against the town; but that no such right
of action would arise, because the town would be under no obligation to furnish him a safe highway for any such purpose. I think
it is quite clear that the decisions against the right of the plaintiff
to recover in such cases, if sustainable, must rest upon some other
ground. While I am quite ready to yield my assent to the reasoning of the learned judge who delivered the opinion in the case
last cited, I am not so well satisfied that the opinion meets the real
point raised for decision. As heretofore remarked, the question
is not, Is the plaintiff barred from recovering for injuries sustained
through the insufficiency of a highway, and which he would otherwise be entitled to recover, because he was at the time he received
the injuries engaged in an unlawful act? but, Was the town under
a legal liability to furnish him a safe highway to travel on, at a
time when he'was, by law, forbidden to travel on it? The liability
of towns for the sufficiency of their highways is wholly imposed by
statute. The right of the traveller to recover for injuries sustained through such insufficiency is also conferred by statute. No
such liability or right existed at common law. The duty and
liability of towns in regard to their highways are due only to
travellers, to that class who have the right to pass and repass
thereon, and continue only so long as they are in the exercise
of that right. When one ceases to use a highway for the purpose of passing and repassing thereon, the duty and liability
of the town toward him in regard thereto cease. This has been
repeatedly decided: Sp encer v. City of Salem, 3 Allen 374;
Richards v. _Bnfield, 13 Gray 344; Blodgett v. City of Boston,
8 Allen 237 ; Stimson v. Gardiner,42 Me. 248 ; Orcutt v. Bridge
Co., 53 Me. 500; Baxter v. Izinooski Turnpike Co., 22 Vt. 124;
Abbott v. WYalcott, 38 Vt. 666; Sykes v. Pawlet, 43 Vt. 446;
Hayward v. Rutland, unreported.
We do not think any good lawyer would contend that a town
would be liable for damages sustained through the insufficiency of
one of its highways, by a circus performer who might chance to
pitch his tent and establish his ring on the highway, and who
should happen to be injured while performing his feats of horsemanship or of lofty tumbling. In such a case the town would
not be liable, because it would not be under any legal duty to pro-
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vide him a highway for any such purpose. Many cases might be
supposed in which the town would not be liable to one injured
through the insufficiency of one of its highways, because the one
receiving the injury would not be using it for a purpose contemplated by the statute, and hence the town would be under no duty
toward him. As a town is liable for such injuries only by force
of the statute, its liability must be limited to those cases in which
the statute has imposed the duty upon it to provide a safe high-way for the injured party in the particular use to which he was,
when injured, putting it. It is competent for the legislature when
creating this duty and liability, or subsequently, to prescribe the
limitations thereof. It may be limited to a particular class of individuals or to special occasions. Is it reasonable to suppose that
the statute was intended to impose this duty and liability in behalf
of a person who was forbidden to use all highways for the purposes of travel, and at a time when he was so forbidden to use
them ? Can he be a traveller within the purview of the statute,
who is forbidden to travel ? The question is its own answer. The
statute imposing this duty and burden was first enacted March 3d
1797: Tolman's Compilation of St., vol. 1, 452, sec. 13. The
same has continued in force, with some immaterial modifications so
far as regards this question, to the present time. On the same
March 3d 1797, was enacted the statute against travelling on the
Sabbath, not exactly in its present form but in substance the
same: Tolman's Compilation, vol. 1, c. 27, §§ 1 and 6. Thus at
the same time the duty was imposed upon towns to provide safe
highways, and they were rendered liable for injuries sustained
through the insufficiencies of such highways, all persons were forbidden to use them on the Sabbath, except for certain purposes.
The statute limiting their use furnishes the measure of the duty
and liability imposed. In other words, the duty and liability imposed are co-extensive with the purposes for which persons can
legitimately use the highways, and no greater. A statute which
forbids the use of highw .ys for certain purposes, or on certain days,
or in a certain manner, would limit the duty and liability of towns
in regard thereto. The statute has limited the amount of load
one may carry on ahighway to 10,000 pounds. He who attempts
to draw a greater load, does it at his own risk, because when he
puts himself in such a position, the town owes him no duty and is
under no liability for injuries received through the insufficiency
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of its highways. The plaintiff, when injured, was forbidden by
law to use the highway, and by reason thereof the defendant town
owed him no duty to provide him any kind of a highway, and therefore was under no liability for any insufficiency in any highway.
So far as the town was concerned, he had no business to be at that
place, at that time, and hence he was there at his own risk. If
he has sustained damages they fall upon himself and not upon the
town, because the statute has not made the town liable for them.
The judgment of the County Court is reversed, and judgment is
rendered for the defendant to recover its costs.
This case presents no inconsiderable
difficulty, and at first view there certainly are many decisions which look
as if this decision should have been tile
other way. Tile English statute 29 Ch.
I1. requires that "no tradesman, artificer, workman, laborer or other person
whatsoever, shall do or exercise any
worldly labor, business or work of their
ordinary callings, upon the Lord's day
(works of charity and necessity only
excepted)," and the English courts have
decided that work which is not done in
the exercise of one's ordinary calling,
although of a secular character, is not
within the statute: Dury v. Defontain,
I Taunt. 131 ; Scarfe v. Iforgan, 4 M.
& W. 270 ; Bigbee v. Leni, 1 Car. & P:
180. In New Hampshire it has been
decided that a person travelling on Sunday may recover, if injured by a fault
in the road which the town was bound
to repair: Dutton v. 11eare, 17 N. 1I.
34. But the New Hampshire statute
contains a provision that no one shall
labor or recreate on Sunday to the annoyance of other persons. The United
States Supreme Court have decided that,
where a railroad company employed
contractors to build a bridge, and for that
purpose drove piles in a river, and owing
to the abandonment of the contract,
the piles were left in the river, in such
a condition as to injure a vessel, when
sailing on her course, the railroad company were responsible for the injury ;
and that the vessel so injured was proseVOL. XXIII.-70

cuting her voyage on Sunday is no
defence for the railroad company:
Phila., sc., R. Co. v. Phila. 4-c., Towboat Co., 23 How. 209. And in the
course of his opinion Mr. Justice ORiEn
remarks: "It is true that cases may be
found in the state of Massachusetts
(see Bosworth v. Swansey, 10 Met. 363,
and Gregg v. Wni.an, 4 Cush. 322),
which on a superficial view might seem
to favor this doctrine of set-off in cases
of tort. But those decisions depend on
the peculiar legislation and customs of
that state, more than on any principles
of justice or law." And in another
part of his opinion, Mr. Justice GmicER
refers to 3fohney v. Cook, 26 Penn. St.
342, in the conclusion of which he concurs, and in that case Mr. Justice
Lowr.IE lays down the law, that a private individual or corporation is liable
to a person travelling on Sunday, if
such person is injured by an obstruction
which the defendants have placed in the
highway, on the ground that " it would
work a very doubtful assistance to morality if we should allow one offender
against the law, to the injury of another, to set off that he too is a public
offender;" and the same principle is laid
down in Etchberry v. Levielle, 2 Hilton
(N. Y.) 40.
But Mr. Justice Lowtni remarks,
extra-judicially indeed, . that the case
may be different when the state or any
of its subdivisions is the defendant. In
the principal case tile question is pre-
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sented in a somewhat different aspect.
And the cases do not seem altogether
consonant with each other, as to how
far one travelling the highway in violation of some statute is thereby barred
of all remedy for injury through defects
in the road. It has been held that the
violation of statutes directing which
side of the road one must take, as that
in passing another team one must turn
to the right, or a statute directing the
rate of speed, as that one must not drive
faster titan six miles an hour, where the
violation of the statute does not injure
another person, or contribute to the
injury received'by the plaintiff, will not
preclude his recovery for an injury
through defect of the highway : Baker
v. City of Portland, lOAm. Law Reg.
N. S. 559, 563, where this general
question is considerably discussed: Gale
v. Lisbon, 52 N. H. 174. We have
already mentioned that it has been decided in New Hampshire that the Sunday law is of this character. But the
Massachusetts courts have decided that
a violation of the Sunday law is such a
breach of faith towards the state, that
the offender cannot come to her courts
to obtain reparation for the injury received during the time he was committing the offence : Bosworth v. Swansey,
10 Mete. 363. The statute prohibiting

travelling on Sunday in Massachusetts
is identical with the one in Vermont,
and is made more sweeping than in other
states, and will bear the construction
which the Massachusetts courts have put
upon it. And the decision in this case
follows their construction. But as the
Massachusetts courts have in Hall v.
Corcoran, 107 Mass. 251, receded fi om
the ground taken in Way v. Foster, I
Allen 408, and in Gregg v. Wyman, 4
Cush. 322, that no action will lie for
an injury to a horse from immoderate
driving if he has been intrusted to the
defendant to be driven in violation of
the Sunday law, it is possible that they
may modify still farther the effect of
this statute. But, at present, the effect
of the extreme view taken of the Sunday
law, by the Massachusetts courts and
others following in their wake, seems
to be, to render all violators of that
law, for the time being, virtual outlaws,
as to all injuries they may happen to
suffer, through the illegal conduct of
others, whether by way of omission or
commission. It seems to be applying
the rules of equity to those who complain of the illegal conduct of others,
that he who would have equity must
first do equity, or that be who would
thrive by the law must first be sure to
L. C. R.
live by it.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
ABRAHAM D. SALMON v. THE DELAWARE, LACKAWANNA &
WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY.
A railroad company is bound to keep its track and contiguous land clear of materials likely to be ignited from sparks issuing from its locomotive properly constructed and driven.
A person owning land contiguous to a railway is not obliged to keep the leaves
falling from his trees, from being carried, by the wind, to such railway, nor to
keep his lands clear of leaves and combustible matter: nor on failure to perform
such acts does he become contributory to the production of a fire originating in
the carelessness, on its own land, of the railroad company.

ACTION for damages caused by a fire occasioned by sparks from
a locomotive of the defendant.
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IT C. Pitney, for plaintiff.
VFanatta, Attorney-General, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
C. J.-The fifth and sixth counts of the declaration,
which have been skilfully drawn, omit altogether the usual allegation
of negligence in the use of the locomotive of the defendant and in
lieu thereof, and for the purpose of throwing an omission of duty on
the part of the defendant, set forth that the railroad track was suffered to be encumbered with combustible matter, and that the fire
in question was caused by igneous cinders falling from the locomotive upon such matter and being thence communicated to the
woodland of the plaintiff; the duty of the defendant in this respect is
stated in these words, viz., "and thereupon it became the duty of
the defendants, when said locomotive engines were being propelled
along said railroad track, to preserve and keep the said strips of
land in such a condition that fire should not be occasioned by
reason of the hot ashes, burning coals and other igneous matter
falling and settling thereon from out of the said locomotive engines, and to take all necessary precautions to prevent any fire
which might be occasioned on said strips from extending to
and burning said sprouts, wood, timber and fences on the said lastmentioned tracts of the said plaintiff." The neglect of this duty
is the gravamen of these two counts, and for the purpose of
testing their sufficiency the defendant has put in a demurrer.
The question, therefore, on this issue is, whether a railroad company owes to the owner of the adjacent land the duty of keeping
its track clear of matter liable to become ignited by fire from its
locomotives, such engines being constructed in all respects in a
legal manner, and being handled with care and skill.
After a careful consideration of this subject, my opinion is that
the duty in question was incumbent on the defendants. Such duty
appears to arise by reasonable intendment out of the legislative
grant to these corporations, of the franchise to run their locomotives. In the absence of chartered rights, the use of such engines
in the usual way, traversing whole districts and throwing cinders
and particles of fire on all sides over the lands in the vicinity of
the road, would be upon the ordinary principles of the law an undeniable nuisance. But, in view of the necessities of our advanced
civilization, the use of such instruments has been legalized. In the
BEASLEY,
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name of the public, the landed proprietor has been compelled to
submit to annoyance and yield up a portion of his abstract rights
to the convenience of the community. But such sacrifice, on the
part of the land-owner under the enlightened policy of this state,
as well as under that of all other civilized countries, has been
made as light as practicable. If the land of the citizen has been
taken from him by compulsion, it has been paid for, and where he
has been subjected to other loss, he has received compensation.
Nor is that all; he has another guaranty against oppression: which
is, that the privileges held by these companies, are all granted on
the implied condition that they are to be so used as to occasion no
unnecessary injury to the citizen. If it is legal to run their engines, such engines must be of the best construction, and if they
can scatter their cinders and sparks it can be done only within the
limit of a strict necessity. If in these respects such stringent obligations exist, why are these companies to be dispensed from all
obligation if their tracks are left in a dangerous condition, with
respect to fire ? They are bound to prevent, by the use of the
most approved device, the escape of the fire from their engines;
what absolves them from all care as to such fire as soon as it has
left such engines ? It is presumed that no one would claim immunity for one of the companies if it should place stacks of hay
or straw in close vicinity to its track, and firing them as it undoubtedly would, with its engine, should thus communicate the
fire to the adjacent lands; and yet it is not easy to see the principle that would impose a responsibility in such case which would
not do so for the omission to put its track in a safe condition.
We are apt to forget when we consider this subject, that the entire
irresponsibility possessed by these companies for damage done by
the fires which they occasion in the due exercise of their privileges,
is derived exclusively from their charters, but bearing this fact in
mind, it becomes much less difficult to assign the limit to such irresponsibility. Being simply clothed with the legal capacities of ordinary persons, if by the use of an engine on their own lands filled
with combustible matter, they should fire such matter, and the
flames should be carried on to the lands adjacent, there would be no
question as to the responsibility for such an act; and the question
in such cases as the one now before us, therefore, is with respect to
the extent of the immunity which has been given to these artificial
persons. The inquiry, in fact, is simply as to the construction in
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this particular, of the charter of the corporation. Did the legislature mean to exempt such corporation from all that liability to
which, at the common law, they would have been subject, for
firing their own land under the conditions already specified ? I
can see no reason to infer either from the language of the charter
of this company, nor from the business authorized, that such was
the legislative intention. That a railroad company should be exonerated from liability for fire unavoidably caused by sparks from
their engine was reasonable enough, but that such exoneration
should be given for fire originating from combustible matter unnecessarily being on their own land would seem to be asuperfluous
concession. It should never be forgotten that grants of this kind
are to be construed strictly, and as was intimated by Lord LANGDALB (Coleman v. Eastern Counties B. C., 10 Beav. 14), as it is
the public interest to protect as far as possible the rights of every
individual, such grants must always be carefully looked to, and must
not be extended further than the legislature has provided, or than is
properly required for the purposes which it has sanctioned. There
appears to be no reason whatever, why, to the evident detriment of
the owners of the lands along a railroad track, a privilege should
be conferred on such company to run their locomotives surrounded
on their own premises by materials so combustible as to be in constant danger of being fired by such engines when running under
ordinary conditions.
This precise question does not appear to have been very much
considered by the courts; there are only two English cases which
seem directly to fouch the subject; the first being that of Vaughan
v. The Taffe Vralley Railway Company, 5 Hurlst. & Nor. 679.
In this case there were two counts in the declaration, the first
count charging that the fire was communicated directly by sparks
from the engine, the second count averred that the premises of the
defendant were out of order from having been left in a state liable
to combustion, and that thereby the fire complained of had occurred.

In the Exchequer Chamber, Chief Justice COCKBURN in the

course of his remarks says, "As regards the second count, if the
facts alleged in that count had been established by the verdict of
the jury, the defendants would have been liable." But the exigency
did not require the point to be decided, so that all that can be
claimed from this case is that it contains this weighty expression
of opinion on the matter in question.
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The other case which is closely pertinent is Smitht v. The
London and South-I11'stern Bailway Company, Law Reports 5

Com. Pleas 98. The circumstances were that the workmen of
the company had left for several weeks during the dry weather
the cuttings, from the grass and hedges along the line of the
road; which taking fire from an engine properly constructed and
driven, the sparks and flames were carried over intervening land
to the property of -the plaintiff. It thus appears that the only
negligence alleged was the omission to keep the track free from
inflammable matter ; and an examination of this report will show
that neither the counsel of the railroad company nor the court
suggested a doubt with respect to the legal duty of the company
to see that its premises were in such a condition. The judgiant in the case was in favor of the plaintiff.
A similar responsibility on the part of railway companies has
been enforced by the courts of some of the Western States, as will
appear from some of the decisions to be hereafter cited on the
point next to be considered.
But there is another aspect to this case.
Besides the counts already considered there are four others, and
these latter ones, unlike the former, contain an averment that the
fire communicated to the premises of the defendant, and thence
spreading to the land of the plaintiff originated from the carelessness of the defendant in the use of its locomotive. To these counts
there is a special plea, the object of which is to set up contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff. The facts stated with this
view are, that the lands of the plaintiff adjoining fhe railroad "were
c, vered with living, growing trees, saplings and bushes, &c., which
:u.nually produced and shed great quantities of leaves ;" that the
plaintiff "during all that time took no care in regard to dried
leaves, and did nothing whatever to prevent them from blowing
Ulnd drifting from the said lands of the said plaintiff to, over, and
upon the said railroad track of the said defendant, but permitted
them to be and remain where they fell on his said track of land to
there become dry and inflammable, and then to be from thence, by
the winds, from time to time, driven, carried and thrown from the
said lands of the said plaintiff to and upon the said lands and railroad track of the said defendant, and in such manner that said
leaves formed a continuous line of dry combustible matter, extending from the said lands and railroad track of the defendant to the
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said lands of the said plaintiff; that said leaves while the said defendant was using its said railroad and its locomotive engines
thereon, in a lawful and careful manner, accidentally and unavoidably caught fire," and thence the injury complained of.
This plea, it is manifest, demands for its support, the concession
that the law requires a man to alter the natural conditions of his
property and to control in some degree, the operation of the laws
of nature with respect to such property in favor of the owner of
the adjacent lands. But this concession I think cannot be made.
In the absence of special legislation a man does not become a
wrongdoer by leaving his property in a state of nature. If water
falls from the clouds upon its surface the owner is not obliged to
counteract the law of gravity in order to prevent such water from
flowing into the adjacent land, or if the soil becomes disintegrated
by the action of the heat he is under no duty to prevent the dust
thence arising from being carried through the air into the house
of his neighbor. Such results are purely sequences of natural
causes, and like all other effects of the vis major must be submitted
to ; they cannot in themselves, form any ground for a legal complaint. When this plea, therefore, attempts to fashion a wrong
out. of such matters, the very essence of legal liability in this
department of torts, is overlooked. Legal negligence does not
consist simply of an *mission to do that which would have
prevented the infliction of damage on another; but in addition to this it involves a breach of duty. Mr. Wharton in his
complete and carefully considered definition of negligence in its
civil relations, says, it "is such an inadvertent imperfection by a
responsible human agent, in the discharge of a legal duty, as immediately produces in an ordinary and natural sequence a damage
to another:" Law of Neg. sect. 2. This plea charges that the
plaintiff did not prevent the leaves falling from his trees, from
being carried by the wind to the land of the defendant, but it altogether fails to show that he was under any legal obligation so to
do. If the law annexed such a condition as that to the ownership
of land, an action would lie for every leaf that should be blown
by the wind from the trees upon such land to the neighboring
property. But there is no such obligation known to the law.
All land is subject to the servitude of receiving the leaves brought
to it in the course of nature, and, as a compensation, can dispose
of its oivn leaves in the same manner. The consequence is, there
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was no negligence in the plaintiff allowing the leaves in question
to be carried to the railway of the defendant, and that being so, it
follows, that being on the land of the defendant rightfully, it became its duty to remove them when it desired to use fire on its
land under dangerous conditions.
Under the force of the principles thus adopted it becomes also
manifest that the plaintiff is not chargeable with any legal neglect
from leaving fallen leaves, the product of the trees, on his own
land. It was his right to leave them there. A person is not
called upon to anticipate negligence on the part of another, and,
by way of prevention, to make provision against its effects. The
fire in question, upon the facts stated in these pleadings, was
caused solely by the illegal act of the defendant, and there is no
provision of law which requires the plaintiff to foresee the doing
of such an act, and to put his own land in a situation to withstand
iis effect. He owes no duty to the defendant in this respect, and
consequently, negligence, in the legal sense, cannot be imputed to
him. It never would be thought that a person owning land in the
vicinity of a canal was bound to raise enbankments around such
property to guard against its overflow from water escaping by negligence, from such artificial aqueduct, and yet the contention for
the existence of such an obligation would be quite as tenable as ib
the claim that the present plaintiff was bound to put his property
in a condition to withstand fire proceeding from the heedlessness
of the defendant. I am aware that it has been ruled in Illinois,
that the owners of lands contiguous to railroads are as much bound
to keep their lands free from dry grass as the railroad company is
on its roadway, but I regard such cases as opposed to well settled
legal principles : Ohio & H. B. B. Co. v. Skanefelt, 47 Illinois
497, 505 ; Illinois Central B. B. Go. v. Nunn, 51 Illinois 78.
If this is the doctrine of the law it is, I think, entirely manifest
that the long line of decisions on the subject of the careless use of
fire by a proprietor on his own property, which we find in the
books, have been rendered in utter disregard of this important condition. The ruling of the courts has invariably been that every
proprietor is responsible for the ordinary and natural consequence
of the careless use of fire on his own premises, and this without the
least reference to the condition of the adjacent lands to which the
conflagration has spread. No support in any of these authorities
can be found for the assumption that if a landowner places his
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stacks of grain or hay on the confines of his land that thereby, in
a legal point of view, he becomes a contributor to a fire occasioned
by negligence on the land of his neighbor. By such an act it is
true he takes the risks of the consequences of an accidental fire on
the contiguous premises, but not of a neglect which he can be
called upon neither to anticipate or to guard against. In the
leading case in Illinois it is assumed that the same duty which will
compel the railway company to clear its roadway of combustibles,
impo.ses an equal obligation on the owner of the contiguous land;
but the distinction between the cases is obvious: the company uses
a dangerous agent and must provide proper safeguards, the landowner does nothing of the kind and has a right to remain quiescent.
The plaintiff should have judgment.

Sup)eevc Court of Illinois.
JOHN L. 3ARS1h

v. FAIRBURY, PONTIAC & NORTH-WESTERN

RAILWAY CO.
Tile specific performance of a contract is a matter not of absolute right in the
party, but of sound discretion in the court.
Railroad companies are incorporated not for the promotion of mere private
ends, but in view of the public good they may subserve ; hence, contracts with
them which cannot be specifically enforced without interfering with the rights of
the public, will not in equity be enforced.

BILL in equity filed in the Livingston county Circuit Court,
setting forth a written contract made by complainant with the defendant, by which it was alleged, that in consideration of the
grant by complainant of the right of way for the railway across his
land- and the procurement of sufficient ground for passenger and
freight depots, and for main and side tracks, the company among
other things agreed to locate its passenger and freight depots upon
the land of complainant, and at no other point. The bill further
alleged that the complainant had secured the right of way for
said company pursuant to the contract, and that it had built and
was operating its road thereon, and that he had procured sufficient
ground for its passenger and freight depots, which the company
was at liberty to use and occupy, and he further offered to fulfil
every other portion of the contract upon his part to be performed;
VOL. XXIII.-71
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but that the company, in violation of its agreement, was about to
locate its passenger and freight depots in another part of the town,
about a mile east, and refused to erect them upon the land of complainant. That he owned a large number of lots where by the
contract the depots should be built, and the prospective advancement in value of these lots was the main inducement that prompted
him to enter into the contract.
The bill asked for the specific performance of the contract, and
prayed an injunction against the erection and use of any passenger and freight depots in the town of Fairbury, outside of the
ground named in the contract.
To the bill a demurrer was interposed.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
SHELDON, J.-This was a bill in Chancery filed to enforce the
specific performance of a contract made by the Fairbury, Pontiac &
North-Western Railway Company, to locate passenger and freight
depots of said road in Marsh's addition to Fairbury and at no other
point in said town. The court below sustained a demurrer to the
bill and dismissed it. This is not a case which concerns merely the
private interests of two suitors. It is a matter where the public
interest is involved. Railroad companies are incorporated by authority of law not for the promotion of mere private ends, but in
view of the public good they subserve. It is the circumstance of
public use which justifies the exercise on their behalf of the right
of eminent domain in the taking of private property for the purpose of their construction. They have come to be almost a public
necessity, the general welfare being largely dependent upon these
modes of inter communication, and the manner of carrying on
their operations. The specific execution of a contract in equity,
is a matter not of absolute right in the party, but of sound discretion in the court, and in deciding whether specific performance
should be enforced against a railway company, the court must
have regard to the interests of the public : Baphall v. Bailway
Co., Law'Rep. 2 Eq. Cases 37. The location of railroad depots
has much to do with the accommodation of the wants of the
public. And when once established a change of affairs may require
a change of location in order to suit public convenience. We
cannot admit that an individual is entitled to call for the interference of a court of equity to compel a railroad company to
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locate unchangeably its depot at a particular spot to subserve the
private advantage of such individual. Railroad companies in
order to ilfil one of the ends of their creation, the promotion of
the public wclfare, should be left fi'ce to establish and re-establish
their depots wheresoever the accommodation of the wants of tile
public may require. To grant the relief asked for by the complainant, we would regard as against public policy, and he must
be left for whatever remedy he may have to his suit at law for
damages. The court below properly sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the bill.

Supreme Court of Jliihgan.
BEAL r. CHASE

AND

TIE ANN ARBOR PUBLISIIING COMPANY.

A contract by the vendor of a good-will, &c., not to engage in a special business within the state, so long as the vendee should continue in the said business,
is not void as in rcstraint of trade, and may be enforced by a court of equity.

BILL in equity for injunction, &c. On appeal from Washtenaw
Circuit Court. The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the
court, which was delivered by
CAMPBELL, J.-There have been two appeals in this case.
The last one was from a decree taken while the former was pending in the Supreme Court, and was made as an additional decree
upon no new hearing, and upon the case as presented to the Circuit Court when the first decree was made. As the statute expressly declares that on a chancery appeal "all proceedings shall
be stayed until otherwise ordered by the Supreme Court" (Comp.
L. § 5181), a majority of us think the Circuit Court had no power
to make the second decree, and that it should be reversed, but
without costs, as the return was not duplicated and the second
decree was made on the judge's own motion. We do not discuss
the questions covered by it.
Upon the first decree the court have arrived at a substantial
agreement, although not agreeing in all respects in the reasons on
which their action will be based. They will content themselves
with as brief a reference as will make their views intelligible.
The bill was filed to restrain the alleged violation of rights
secured to complainant in connection with a sale to him by defend
ant Chase of a printing and publishing business and certain copy.
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rights. Chase had built up a large and prosperous business in
Ann Arbor, known very generally through the state and elsewhere,
and having a very widely extended custom, under the name of
"Dr. Chase's Steam Printing House." He had also published a
very popular receipt book, which was circulated largely by means
of correspondence and agencies, as well as advertising, and brought
in large profits. For a. large and adequate consideration, Chase
sold to Beal his whole establishment, including a newspaper, the
receipt book and other copyrights, "together with the good-will
of the business of printing and publishing, and also the right to
use the name of Dr. Chase in connection with said books," and
providing that the said Beal, on his part, if he chooses, may carry
on said business, and shall have that exclusive right under the
name of "Dr. Chase's Steam Printing House," and may add
R. A. Beal, proprietor. The accounts were also transferred, and
some other things not important here. The following important provisions are directly involved in this controversy: Chase
,agreed not to engage directly or indirectly "in the business of
printing and publishing in the state of Michigan," so long as
Beal should remain in the business of printing and publishing in
Ann Arbor. Beal was also "1to have the privilege of receiving
the letters connected with said business and opening the same."
This was in August 1869. Chase left Ann Arbor not many
months thereafter, and was absent some time in another residence
in the West. Just after the sale he gave Beal authority to take
from the post-office all letters not directed to his private box, and
to obtain and receipt for all remittances and orders for money.
Beal continued in a prosperous business and unmolested, until the
course of action complained of began in 1872.
Chase, during that year, having conceived the opinion that his
contract was void as an undue restraint of trade, began preparations for a new printing business, and began to prepare a new
receipt book, and revoked his authority to Beal to obtain the letters
not addressed to the printing-house.
-In August 1872, several persons who bad been thinking of setting up a printing establishment, but who had done nothing, negotiated with Chase, the result of which was the formation of the
defendant corporation with a nominal capital of $50,000, of which
Chase took one-half. They immediately began a general printing
and publishing business and started a newspaper, and became for-
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midable rivals of Beal. Dr. Chase became, and was announced
conspicuously as their president and business manager. He prepared a new receipt book, which was called " Dr. Chase's Seconti
Receipt Book," and which purported to include receipts on many
subjects covering similar ground with the first, but more extensive
and higher priced. Vigorous efforts were made to circulate it as
superior to the first, and it was brought directly to the attention
of persons who had dealt in or purchased the first. For this purpose use was made of correspondence intended for the publishers
of the first book, and persons writing for that were informed of
the publication, and impressed with the superiority of the second
book.
Beal filed a bill in 1872 to restrain the publication of thissecond
book, which the Ann Arbor Printing and Publishing Company
had made an agreement to publish on a royalty. In July 1873,
the present bill was filed complaining of all the acts above mentioned.
After suit was brought Chase sold out his stock and retired
from the company, and the publication of the second receipt book
was removed to Toledo.
The final decree enjoined Chase from being engaged directly or
indirectly in the printing and publishing business in this state, or
printing or publishing the second receipt book in this state, and
from taking or opening any letters relating to Dr. Chase's recipes
or Chase's Steam Printing House. The defendant corporation was
enjoined from doing said business with or for Chase, directly or
indirectly.
We are all agreed that Chase's connection with the business of
the defendant company was such as to be a direct violation of his
contract, and that the company knew of the contract throughout.
We are all agreed that the measures taken to get a circulation of
the New Receipt Book by the agencies and correspondence which
had been or were at any time used or designed for the first were
unlawful. We are all agreed that Beal was entitled to all correspondence intended for the old establishment and first receipt book,
and that in case of'doubt he was entitled to the benefit of the doubt
as to its being so intended.
We are all agreed that Chase had no right to publish, by the
terms of that contract, in Michigan (if valid), any receipt book so
connected with his name as to lead to the inference that it was de-
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signed to supersede the old one. And we concur (with some doubt
on the part of one of us) that the New Receipt Book, with its title
and announcements, has that tendency.
Concerning the validity of the agreement, we concur in regarding it as not unreasonable in fact, and as based on full consideration. One of us has doubted whether it could properly include the
whole state, but considering the rule to the contrary as somewhat
artificial, he concurs in maintaining the agreement.
Although some questions might arise as to whether a corporation
could be restrained from dealings prohibited to a stockholder
merely because it had such a stockholder, we do not discuss that,
because Chase's connection with this company was something more,
and the terms of the decree cannot fairly be wrested into any unreasonable meaning.
The decree is affirmed with costs, leaving questions of damages
to be determined at law, and directing a power or authority to be
executed whereby Beal can obtain the letters belonging to him, and
so modifying the decree below as may be necessary to that end.
The decree may stand as equivalent thereto until such authority is
executed, and be used to obtain such letters from the post-office.

United States Circuit Court. NAorthern District of Georgia.
BROWN v. TIlE UNITED STATES Ex REL. BRIDGES.
The courts of the United States have power to issue writs of habeas corpus to
relieve from imprisonment persons confined under sentence of a state court, where
the record shows that the state court had no jurisdiction of the alleged offence.
Bridges was indicted, convicted and sentenced in a state court for perjury, committed in a proceeding before a United States commissioner, under an Act of Congress. He sued out a habeas corpus before the United States Circuit Court.
Held,
-1. That the indictment showed that the perjury alleged was not a crime against
the state, and that the proceedings of the state court were therefore void.
2. That the United States court had power to discharge the relator.

Tnis was a writ of habeas corpus, under the first section of the Act
of Congress of February 5th 1867, in behalf of Dock Bridges. a
freedman, citizen of the United States and of Georgia. The application set forth that Bridges was held in imprisonment in the state
penitentiary, without law or right, and in violation of the Constitution
and laws of the United States, charged with the crime of perjury
against the laws of Georgia; that he was not guilty, or if guilty of
any offence, it was not against the state, but against the United
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States, whose courts have exclusive jurisdiction ; that he was convicted and sentenced by the Superior Court of Randolph county, in
said state, for eight years at hard labor, in said penitentiary, for having
committed perjury while testifying as a witness before a commissioner
of the United States Circuit Court, Ibr the southern district of Georgia,
in a preliminary examination, in a case of the United States against one
Nicholas Kinney, arrested on a warrant issued by said commissioner.
charging Kinney with being guilty of a crime against the laws of the
United States-a violation of the Enforcement Act of' May 31st 1870
-committed in said district, on the 7th of October 1874.
To the petition was annexed a copy of the record of the proceedings
in said Superior Court, containing among other matters the indictment,
the petitioner's only plea-not guilty, names of the jurors, testimony
of the witnesses, the verdict, motion for a new trial, the decision overruling it. and the sentence of the court.
The bill of indictment was as follows:(Georgia, landolph County, &c. The grand jury: &e., in the name
and behal" of the citizens of Georgia, charge and accuse Dock Bridges
(and four others) of the state aforesaid, of perjury
For that the said Dock Bridges, &c., on the 22d day of October, A. D.
1874, and in the county aforesaid, there being then and there pending
and under legal investigation before L. A. Guild, a lawful commissioner
of the United States, exercising and holding jurisdiction in said county
and state, a charge against Nicholas Kinney, for a violation of the Enfbrecment Act, passed by the Congress of the United States, and of
fiorce in said county and state, the said investigation being a proceeding
under the execution of a warrant by D. 0. Bancroft, Deputy United
States Ilarshal, against said Nicholas Kinney, fbr the said offence
of a violation of the Enforcement Act, and the said investigation being
then and there a preliminary inquiry by L. A. Guild, United States
Commissioner, as aforesaid, to ascertain whether or not there existed
probable cause for said charge against said Nicholas Kinney, then and
there before the said L. A. Guild, who was then and there an officer aforesaid, lawfully authorized to administer an oath, who swore the said
Dock Bridges, &c., as witnesses in the ease aforesaid, the said witnesses
then and there taking the oath upon the Holy Evangelists of Almighty
God, and then and there, in the manner aforesaid swearing, did state
under their oath as afbresaid, that the said Nicholas Kinney, in a threatening manner, and with a knife in hand, in the town of Dawson, of
Terrell county, and said state, did attempt to prevent said Dock Bridges,
&c., from voting, unless they should vote the Democratic ticket, at an
election being held at the court-house in the town of Dawson. of Terrell county and said state, on the 7th day of October, A. 1. 1874. for a
member of the legislature to represent said county of Terrell in the
General Assembly of said state, which statement so sworn by said Dock
Bridges, &c., was then and there material to the issue on trial in said
case; whereas, in truth and in fact, the said Nicholas Kinney, on the
said 7th day of October, in the year 1874, at said election being
then and there held in the town of Dawson as aforesaid, did not, in a
threatening manner, and with knife in hand, attempt in-said town of
])awson to prevent the said Dock Bridges, &c., from voting at said
election, unless they should vote the Denocratic ticket; and the grand
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jurors aforesaid, on their oath aforesaid, do charge that the said Dock
Bridges (and four others), on the said 22d day of October, A. D. 1874,
and in the said county of Randolph, and in the manner alresaid, did
wilfully, knowingly, absolutely swear to the aforesaid false statement,
contrary to the laws of said state, the good order, peace and dignity
thereof'"
The petition prayed for the writ of habeas corpus, under the provisions of the Act of February 5th 1867.
The principal keeper of the state penitentiary, to whom the writ was
directed, returned, that, in obedience to it, he produced the body of
Bridges before the court; but that, as such principal keeper, he declined to surrender him, on the ground that he had been indicted and
convicted of perjury in the Superior Court of Randolph county, Georgia,
and that court had sentenced him to eight years' confinement at hard
labor in the state penitentiary; that he held him under that sentence;
that no United States judicial authority had jurisdiction to inquire
further into the cause of his detention; that it was only the Superior
Court of Randolph county aforesaid, that could legally inquire into it or
discharge him from custody.
So much of the return as questioned the jurisdiction of a Federal
court or judge to inquire into the cause of the imprisonment of
Bridges, was argued by counsel for respondent, relying principally upon
the case of Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506. The objection was overruled and the marshal was instructed to take Bridges into his custody
during the peudency of these proceedings.
The following opinion was delivered by
ERSKINE, J.-From the earliest period of the common law, no freeman
could be detained in prison except upon a criminal charge, or civil action.
In the former case, it was always in his power to demand of the Supreme
Court of criminal jurisdiction iii the kingdom, a habeas corpus,commanding the party restraining him to produce the body before the court, with
the cause of detention, that it might inquire into its sufficiency, and
either remand, bail or discharge the prisoner. This ancient barrier
against oppression was, at Runnymede, built into that portion of the wall
of the great charter which protects the personal liberty and property of
all freemen, by giving security from arbitrary imprisonment and arbitrary spoliation. As is well established in legal history, this statute was
confirmed many times by Parliament. And it was tersely said by Sir
EDWARD COKE, during the debate in the House of Commons on the
petition of right, "M a gna Charta is such a fellow that he will have no
sovereign." The very essence of the 29Lh chapter of the charter is,
among other immunities from oppression, incorporated into the fifth
article of amendment of the National Constitution.
The framers of the Constitutiou, activelkr mindful of the value of this
remedy, guaranteed its permanence by a provision in that instrument,
that its privilege shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it. The Judiciary Act
of 1789 provided that each of the several national courts, as well as either
of the justices of the Supreme Court and district judges, should have
power to grant the writ of habeas corpus, with the proviso, however, that
it "shall, in no case, extend to persons in jail, unless where they are in
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custody under or by color of authority of the United States, or committed tor trial before a court thereof, or are necessary to be brought into
court to testify." And by the terms of the 7th section of the Act of
March 12th 1833, it may be granted, in all cases of' a prisoner in jail,
when he shall be committed on, or by any authority of law, for any act
done, or omitted to be done, in pursuance of a law of the United States,
or any order, process or decree of any judge or court thereof. This was
fbllowcd by the Act of August 29th 1842, which concerns international
law. To give greater vitality to the writ, and to extend its efficacy,
Congress passed the Act of February 5th 1867. The first section enacts : " That the several courts of the United States, and the several
justices and judges of such courts, within their respective jurisdictions,
in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power
to grant writs of habeas corpuns in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the Constitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States ; and it shall be lawful fbr such person so restrained of his or her liberty, to apply to either of said justices
or judges for a writ of habeas corpus, which application shall be in writing, &c., * * * * and the said justice or judge, to whom such application shall be made, shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corl7us, unless
it shall appear from the petition itself that the party is not deprived of
his or her liberty in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the
United States. * * * * The said court or judge shall proceed in a
summary way to determine the facts of the case by hearing testimony
and the arguments of the parties interested; and if it shall appear that
the petitioner is deprived of his or her liberty in contravention of the
Constitution or laws of the United States, he or she shall forthwith be
discharged and set at liberty," &c. See United States Revised Statutes,
sects. 751-766, where the various habeas corpus acts are grouped.
The question for consideration is, to me, one of original impression,
and it might have been determined elsewhere, and probably before now,
had a different course been pursued -in the state court; had the petitioner Bridges, on his arraignment there, demurred fbr want of jurisdiction appearing upon the record - that the offence charged was
committed beyorid the jurisdiction of that or any other court of this
state, and within the jurisdiction of another government; or shown these
facts in evidence under the plea of not guilty; or, on return of the verdict, moved in arrest ofjudgment; and, if in any of these instances, or
on the overruling of his motion for a new trial, the decision was adverse to him, he could have carried his ease to the state Supreme Court
-a tribunal presided over by judges of distinguished ability-and if
that court affirmed the judgment of the lower tribunal still lie had the
privilege to sue out a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the
United States, and have the question re-examined there; but as a duty
has presented itself, and as this duty has devolved upon me, it will be
performned-perfbrined, I trust, without marring the harmony, or weakening the ties of comity between the state and national judicial authorities.
The judiciary power of every government can look beyond its own
municipal laws incivil cases, and can take cognisanee of all subjects of
litigation between parties within its territorial limits and jurisdiction,
though the controversy relate to the laws of a foreign country. But,
VOL. XXIII.-72
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as regards crime, the rule is otherwise ; for the courts of one state or
nation will not hold cognisance of, nor enforce the criminal laws of an.
other. And as to crimes made so by lcgislative enactments, the
government of the United States stands in the same relation to the
government of this state as any foreign power. Mr. Justice STORY, in
giving the opinion of the Supreme Court, in Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat
304.said: "No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States
can, consistently with the Constitution, be delegated to state tribunals."
Thus it is manifest, that the state courts cannot hold criminal j urisdiction over offences exclusively existing as offences against the United
States ; for every criminal prosecution' must charge the crime to have
been committed against the sovereign whose courts sit in judgment upon
the offender, and whose authority can pardon him.
In Commonwealth v. Tenny, 97 Mass. 50, the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts, held that the offence of embezzlempnt, by a person in
the employment of a national bank, located in that state, of the property
of individuals deposited in such bank, not being punishable under any
existing law of the United States, the state courts had jurisdiction
thereof, under the state statutes. The court said : " There is no view
of the relation of the concurrent power of the two governments, which
affects the decision in the present case; for all courts and jurists agree
that state sovereignty remains unabridged for the punishment of all
crimes committed with the limits of a state, except so far as they have
been brought within the sphere of Federal jurisdiction, by the penal
laws of the United States."
The language of the court in that case admits neither of doubt nor
comment. It indicates, in terms too significant to be misunderstood,
that, had Congress declared the act a crime, the state tribunals would
have been altogether without jurisdiction over the offender..
In The State v. Adams, 4 Blackf. 146, the defendant was indicted
for making a false affidavit of his being an actual settler on the
public lands under the Act of Congress of April 5th 1832. The court
below quashed the indictment for want of jurisdiction, and, on error
the state Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Said BLACKFORD,
J., in delivering the opinion of the court: " We have a statute saying, that any person, who shall wilfully and falsely make an affidavit,
&c., shall be deemed guilty of perjury: Revised Code 1831, p. 186.
And it is contended for the prosecution tlat the indictment before us
is sustainable under that statute. But this doctrine cannot be supported.
The affidavit was made under an Act of Congress relative to the sale
of public land, and if the party making it committed perjury, he must
be punished under the Act of Congress prohibiting the offence. The
state courts have no jurisdiction."
In the case of The State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83, the prisoner was indicted for perjury alleged to have been committed before a commissioner
in bankruptcy, appointed by the District !Court of the United States,
under the Bankrupt Act of 1841. On demurrer to the indictment the
Supreme Court of Judicature gave judgment sustaining the demurrer.
PARKER, C. J., announcing the decision, said: "Here is another government whose laws are operative, to a certain extent, over the territory
of the state, and having tribunals here competent to punish any offences
committed against its laws, or in the course of any of its proceedings.
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The commissioners in bankruptcy not only derive no authority from
this state, but they cannot be regarded as having exercised their offices
by any permission, tacit or otherwise, from it. They derive their authority from a paramount law, and the state could not object to the
exercise by them of the duties of their office within its limits, if it had
the disposition so to do. The offence, if committed as alleged, is clearly
a crime under the laws of the United States."
Similar in almost every respect to the preceding and former cases, is
the recent one of ic People v. Kelley, 38 Cal. 145 (1869). Kelley
was indicted in a county court for perjury, committed by swearing
fhlsely as to a settlement and cultivation of a tract of land-part of the
public domain of the United States. The prisoner demurred, on the
rmrund that the state court had no jurisdiction of the offence, because
it was not committed in any court of the state. The demurrer was
overruled, and the prisoner convicted. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, it was there held that the demurrer should have been sustained.
In giving the opinion of the court, SAWYER, 0. J., said : " Tie state
tribunals have no power to punish crimes against the laws .of the United
States, as such. The same act may, in some instances, be an offence
against the laws of both, and it is only as an offence against the state
laws that it can be punished by the state in any event."
The Supreme Court of New York, in The People v. Sweetman, 3
Park. Crim. 1. 358, on certiorarito the Court of Oycr and Terminer,
decided-reversing the conviction-that false swearing by a person in
giving testimony in a proceeding of naturalization before a state court,
is an offence against the United States, and is not punishable by a state
court : because " the state court acted as the agent of the government,
and was, pro hac vice, a tribunal of the United States."
In direct conflict with The Peop~le v. Sweetn an, is Rump v. Commonicealth, 30 Pa. St. 475. Rump was convicted before the Quarter
Sessions of Philadelphia, for having falsely and corruptly sworn before
the District Court of the city and county of Philadelphia, on an application of a party to become a citizen of the United States. On error
to the Quarter Sessions, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed
the judgment.
The Act of Congress of April 14th 1802, 3 Stats. 153, empowers
not only the Circuit and District Courts of the United States, and the
territorial courts, but also state courts of record having common-law
jurisdiction, a seal and clerk, to admit aliens to national citizenship.
Congress has, under the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, plenary power to pass naturalization laws, and to bestow if it
chooses upon state tribunals, authority, concurrent with the Federal
courts, to admit aliens to citizenship, in pursuance of the laws of Congress ; and when the state courts, under sanction of state authority (for
they are under no obligation to furnish tribunals for administering those
laws), act upon the delegated authority, they, by the positive law, per.
form judicial functions : Prigg v. The Common wealth of Pennsylvania,
16 Peters 608.
Adverting for a moment to the cases of The State v. Adams, The State
v. P1ike, Theeolle v. Kell!], The Peo)le v. Sweetman, and Rum) v. Conmoucealth (supra), it will be seen, that in the first three, the alleged
offences were committed bcfbre United States officers empowered by
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Congress to administer oaths, and those state tribunals decided that
they had no jurisdictiun to punish the defendants. In the fourth case,
the corrupt oath was imade before a state tribunal, in a naturalization
case, and, on certiorarito the Criminal Court, the Supreme Court of
New York reversed the conviction, holding that the United States courts
were the only tribunals that couldpunish the delinquent. Whether that
case, or Rump v. Commonwealth, is in consonance with the nature and
genius of our form of government-in unison with those principles of
state and national criminal jurisprudence which accompany our complex
and seemingly, but not really, permiscible system of polity-need not
be resolved; for it is not a point in judgment. And for like reason, it
is unnecessary, and indeed would be too curious, to inquire whether
there could be a second punishment of the defendant in the Pennsylvania case, for the same identical act-first by the state laws and afterwards by the United States laws: Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13; x
parte Lang, 18 Wall. 163. And see Mr. Bishop'slearned and accurate
Commentaries on Criminal Law, vol. 1, 5th ed. §§ 178, 179, 984-989;
Id. vol. 2, § 1023.1
Within the territorial limits of the individual states, there exist two
distinct and separate governments, each restricted in its sphere of action,
and each independent of the other, except in one particular. "That
particular," said Mr. Justice FIELD, in Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397,
" consists of the supremacy of the authority of the United States,
when any conflict arises between the two governments. The Constiare declared by the Contution and the laws passed in pursuance of it,
stitutiun itself to be the supreme law of the land, and the judges of
every state are bound thereby, ' anything in the constitution or laws of
any state to the contrary notwithstanding.'" **** And after making
a quotation from Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506, which concludes
thus: "And that in the sphere of action assigned to it (the General
Government), it should be supreme, and strong enough to execute its
own laws by its own tribunals, without interruption from a state, or from
state authorities," he adds: "And the judicial power conferred extends
to all cases arising under the Constitution, and thus embraces every
legislative Act of Congress, whether passed in pursuance of it or in
disregard of its provisions. The Constitution is under the view of the
tribunals of the United States when any Act of Congress is brought
before them for consideration."
Indeed it is essential to the very existence of the National Government
that. its courts of justice should be wholly independent of state power to
carry into effect its own laws.
'The indictment charges the petitioner with having committed the
crime of perjury against the laws of the state of Georgia, before L., A.
Guild, a commissioner of the United States, lawfully authorized to administer an oath, in a preliminary investigation, on an accusation made
against one Kinney, who was arrested by a United States deputy marshal, on a warrant charging him with the offence of violating the Enforcement Act passed by Congress, by making an attempt to prevent the
petitioner from voting at an election for a member of the legislature of
said state.
I See Jett v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 7 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 260.-ED.
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By sect. 5392 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, it is provided that every person having taken an oath before a competent
tribunal, officer or person, illany case in which a law of the United
States authorizes an oath to be administered, that he will testify' truly,
who wilfully and contrary to such an oath states any material matter
which lie does not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury.
As already mentioned, the petitioner is charged with having committed the alleged offence before a United States officer, in a proceeding
then pending before him, being an examination into an accusation
against a party for a violation of the fourth and fifth sections of the Act
of Congress of May 31st 1870, 16 Stats. 141, commonly called the
" Enforcement Act."
It is entitled, "'An act to enforce the rights of
citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this Union,
and for other purposes."
By the eighth section it is declared that the
United States courts " shall have, exclusively of the courts of the
several states, cognisance of all crimes and offences committed against
the provisions of this act." See also 9th and 11th sects. of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 ; Revised Statutes, sect. 712.
Sect. 4460 of the code of this state declares that " perjury shall consist in wilfully, knowingly, absolutely and falsely swearing, * * * or
affirming in a manner material to the issue, or point in question, in some
judicial proceeding, by a person to whom a lawful oath or affirmation
has been administered ;" and sect. 4461 prescribes the punishment.
To my mind, it is clear that the words "judicial proceeding," as here
used, refer solely to judicial proceedings under the laws of the state and
its own tribunals of justice ; no other meaning can be assigned to them.
To extend their signification beyond this, would be an endeavor to empower state courts to invade the judicial authority of a distinct and
separate government, and to punish persons for offences committed by
them against the laws of another sovereign : The Peol)lc v. Kelley, stpra.
The provision in the code, defining the offence and naming the punishment, is a general law of the state. Now, keeping in view the complex character of our government- the dual relation which the individual
states and the nation bear to each other-surely the texture of any
argument must prove to be too frail, which would attempt to uphold the
proposition that a crime committed in a judicial proceeding, before an
officer of the United States, is a transgression of the criminal laws of
a state. And, as not impertinent to what has been remarked, it may be
asserted, with entire confidence in its correctness, that no justice or
judge of a court of the United States, nor a commissioner of a Circuit
Court of the United States, can, as such officer, administer an oath for
state purposes, or issue a process to arrest a party for a violation bf state
laws, or inquire into his guilt or innocence. Nor do these familiar acts
of Congress, which have deputed state chancell)rs, judges and other
magistrates to administer oaths, take acknowledgments, &e., in certain
specified cases, in anywise affect what has just been said in regard to
Federal officers as such.
Pausing to observe the facts developed here, and the principles of law
which arise from them, it may now be inquired whether a proceeding
by hacas corpits, even under the provisions of the Act of February 5th
1867.-which empowers the several Federal courts, and either of the
justices or judges of suel courts, to award the writ in all cases where
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a party is in custody in violation of the Constitution, or of any law of
the United States-is a suitable and legal remedy to test the validity
of the imprisonment of the petitioner, and to release him, if restrained
of his liberty in contravention of the Constitution or laws of the United
States. It will not be questioned that, upon a cursory glance at this
cause,-which is a civil suit, although it be before a judge instead of a
court (Exparte Milligan, 4 Wall. 1 ; and see Revised Stats., sect. 763),
-even the legal mind might be impressed with a doubt as to the appropriateness and legal soundness of this sumpnary interposition. For (it
may be said) thus to attempt to review a final judgment of a state tribunal of the highest original jurisdiction in civil Lud criminal causes,
by a mode of procedure not c6nformable to the ancient and regular
course heretofore used in the administration of justice between state
courts and those of the Union, would be to authorize a Federal judge to
employ this writ as if it were a writ of error from a superior to an inferior tribunal. Such views may be plausible, but they do not convince ;
for it is obvious from the language and spirit of the act that it was not
in the mind of Congress to give it the effect assumed,-to have done so
would have been to clothe a judge of a Federal court with a power
hitherto unheard of in national legislation. If, however, it be a legal
fact that the Superior Court of Randolph county had jurisdiction of the
offence and the offender, although the course of the court may have been
irregular, and the conviction and judgment erroneous, the errors could
not be corrected by a Federal judge in a proceeding in habeas corpus,
or, by such officer, in any other way known to our jurisprudence.
But, if the state court did not have jurisdiction of the case, its judgment is utterly void, and the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in
violation of the Constitution, and the Act of 1867 affords a proper and
legal remedy to administer relief. If he committed the crime, as
charged by the state in the indictment, the act was done within the
authority and exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts; and, as they
are the sole tribunals that could try him, so they alone could punish him.
*It follows, necessarily, from what has now been stated, that every person
who infringes the criminal or penal laws of a particular government,
can be tried and punished by that government only. And it is not too
strong an expression to assert that it is a fundamental right of every
citizen of, or person commorant within, the United States, to be tried
by the tribunals of justice of that sovereign power whose criminal code
he has transgressed; and the complement of this rule or axiom is, immunity or exemption from trial or punishment for that offence by any
other government or sovereignty. The disregarding of this immunity
has deprived the petitioner of his liberty in contravention of the "law
of the land ;" he was proceeded against and condemned without "due
process of law." The fifth article of amendment of the Constitution
declares, among other immunities from arbitrary oppression, that no
"person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This bulwark against invasion from the General Government is extended by the fourteenth article of amendment, which forbids
" any state" to " deprive any person of life,, liberty or property, without
due process of law." Mr. Justice JoUNsoN, in Bank of Columbia v.
Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, in speaking of the phrase " law of the land,"
which means the same as "due process of law" (Cooley on Constitutional
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Limitations 353), said that these words from Magna Charta were " intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of tile
powers of government, unrestrained by the established principle of private rights and distributive justice ;" an exposition which has received
the unqualified approval of a jurist of the highest eminenc : Id. 355.
As collaterally illustrative of the constitutional question as just presented, the fifteenth chapter of title thirteen of the Revised Statutes,
iIpss m, and sections 1778 to 1785 of Story onl the Constitution, may be
referred to.
As the crime is alleged to have been committed before a United
States Circuit Court comnissioner, at a place within the southern judicial
distric't of this state, I am of the decided opinion that the Federal courts
for that district are the only tribunals that have-cognisance of tile
offending.
offence ad jurisdiction to try the party
There is another provision in the Constitution, directly pertinent to
the question involved in this investigation, and which may be treated
either as a distinct proposition or as a corollary to those already invoked.
A little more than a year anterior to the passage of the amendatory
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, the thirteenth article of amendment of the
Constitution was ratified. It ordains that " neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or
any place subject to their jurisdiction."
Mr. Justice MILLER, in delivering the opinion of the court in the
Slaughter Rouse Cases, 16 Wall. 72, said " Undoubtedly while negro
slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which enacted the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If
Mexican peonage or the Chinese Coolie labor system shall develop slavery
of'the Mexican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment
may safely be trusted to make it void. And so if other rights are assailed by the states which properly and necessarily fall within the
prote-tion of these articles [thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth]. tlat
protection will apply,. though the paity interested may not be of African
descent."
If,as already observed, the United States courts are the only tribunals that have jurisdiction over the offence and power to punish the
offender, then the petitioner has not had a trial under the provisions
of the Constitution ; and it follows from his imprisonment under selltence of tihe Superior Court of Randolph county, that he is held in
" involuntary servitude "-a condition inhibited by the thirteenth article, "except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted."
Throughout this investigation, the questions in controversy have
been considered without any regard whatever to the fact that the petitioner is of the negro race. The proceedings came before me under
the first section of the amendatory Habeas Corpus Act of 1867. And
where, in a case like this-one, if I am not in error, that is fairly ineluded, as well within the scope and true meaninm of the language used
by Mr. Justice MILLER, speaking of the late amendments in the sentence last quoted, as within other provisions of the Constitution which
have been applied to the principles pervading this case-the original or
secured privileges and immunities of any person within the United States,
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or any place subject to their jurisdiction, are invaded. distipctions in
races become incommensurable.
TPhe petitioner is deprived of his liberty in contravention of the Constitution and laws of the United States, but I decline to discharge him
absolutely, for the following causes: I am informed by the United
States attorney, that an accusation stands against Bridges for the
identical crime charged iQ the above indictment, and that this accusation can be investigated by the grand jury of the United States Circuit
Court for the southern district of Georgia, which will be impannelled
within a few days; and Attorney-General Hammond, of counsel for
respondent, having made application for an appeal to the Circuit Court,
therefore, Dock Bridges will be recommittedl by the marshal to the jail
of Fulton county, and there remain until further 6rder: Matter of Tson, 8 Mich. 70 ; Xatter of Ring, 28 Cal. 247 ; Ex parte Gibson, 31
Id. 610; Hurd. on Habeas Corpus 416, et seq.; Revised Statutes, sect.
763.
Ordered accordingly.
The respondent appealed from this order to the Circuit Court.
Farrow, United States District Attorney, and Thomas, for petitioner,
cited and relied upon the following authorities: Act February 20th
1812; Act of August 23d 1842; 33d sect. Act of September 24th
1789 ; Act of May 31st 1870 ; United States Statutes, vol. 4, 118, sect.
13; Id. vol. 1, 78, sect. 11; Revised Statutes. sect. 629; United States
Statutes, vol. 16, 142. sect. 8 ; United States Constitution, art. 6, par. 2;
Act of April 21st 1806; Bouvier 533; Revised Statutes, sect. 743; 1
Wharton's Crim. Law 185, 197; 2 Bishop's Crim. Law, sect. 987;
ne People v. Kelley, 38 Cal. 145; State v. Pike, 15 N. H. 83 ; State
v. Adams, 4 Blackford 146.
.
J. Hammond, Attorney-General of the state of Georgia, for respondent, cited Acts of Congress, 1794, sect. 1 ; Crimes Act 1825, sects.
13, 26; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 421; Act of 1789,,Bright. 301, sect 1;
1 Wash. 232 ; 1 'McAllister 74; 3 How. 103 ; 5 MIcLean 92, 100, 174 ;
1 Gall. 1 ; 2 Wall, Jr., 525; 3 Peters 193; The People v. Kelley, 38
Cal. 145. And he argued, inter alia, that the Habeas Corpus Act of
Congress, of the 5th of February 1867, is to amend said Act of 1789.
It simply extends the power of the United States courts, in habeas corpts,
to persons restrained of liberty in violation of the Constitution, or any
treaty or laws of the United States. See 14 Stats. at Large 385.
Its terms seem not to apply to cases where final judgment has passed,
a nd the party is imprisoned in execution of sentence, and, if it applies
to any new case this amendment nowhere repeals the proviso of the Act
of 1789, and Mr. Brightly under it cites the cases from McAllister's
Reports, supra, as showing the limit to the United States authority.
What clause of the Constitution of the United States-which law or
treaty of the United States-is violated by this prisoner being punished
for perjury by a state court?

BRADLEY, J.-Dock Bridges was indicted in the Superior Court of
Randolph county. Georgia, for perjury committed October 22d 1874,
in an examination before a United States Commissioner, under the En-
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forcement Act. The offence, though set out according to its circumstances, was clargcd to have been committed against the laws of Georgia;
but it was obvious that it was a crime against the laws of the United
States only. It was perjury committed in the course of a judicial investigatimn under the Acts of Congress, and was an offence against the public
justice of the United States. By the revised statutes of the United
States. sect. 5392, every person, who'having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer or person, in any case in which a law of the
United States authorizes an oath to be administered, wilfully and contrary to said oath, states any material matter which he does not believe
to be true, is guilty of perjury, and shall be punished by fine and
imprisonmeout, prescribed by the act, and be thereafter incapable of
giving testimony in any court of the United States. Such an offence is
exclusively cognisable in the courts of the United States. By sec. 609
of the revised statutes, it is declared that the Circuit Courts shall have
exclusive cognisanee of all crimes and offences cognisable under the
authority of the United States, except when otherwise provided, and
coneu.rcnt jurisdiction with the District Courts of crimes and offences
cognisable therein : and by sect. 711 the jurisdiction vested in the courts
of the United States, of. all crimes and offences cognisable under the
authority of the United States, shall be exclusive of the courts of the
several states. The validity of thesd Acts of Congress is not questioned.
It would be a manifest incongruity for one sovereignty to punish a
person for an offence committed against the laws of another sovereignty.
And whilst certain offences, involving breaches of the peace, counterfeiting the public money, &c., may be violations of both Federal and
state laws, and punishable under both, perjury in a judicial proceeding
is peculiarly an offence against the system of laws under which the court
is organized and proceeding. At all events, Congress has declared that
the courts of the United States shall have cognisance, exclusive of the
state courts, of all crimes and offences cognisable under its authority.
Hence it was clearly in violation of the laws of the United States for
the state court to try and imprison the defendant for the crime in question. The court had no jurisdiction of the case. The proceedings were
null and void.
It is contended, however, that where a defendant has been regularly
indicted, tried and convicted in a state court, his only remedy is to carry
the judgment to the court of last resort, and thence by writ of error to
the Supreme Court of the United States, and that it is too late for a
lhbeas corpus to issue from a Federal court in such a case. This might
be so if the proceeding in the state court were merely erroneous; but
where it is void for want of jurisdiction, habeas cotpus will lie: Ex
parle Lange, 18 Wall. 163.
As a general rule, when it appears by a return to a habeas corpus
that the prisoner is confined upon a regular charge and commitment for
a criminal offence, and especially if he be confined in execution after a
conviction, lie will be at once returned into custody; and to this
cautionary and conservative rule the fourteenth section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 provided, that the writ should in no case extend to prisoners
in jail. unless where they were in custody under or by color'of the authority of the United States, or were committed for trial before some
court of the same, or were necessary to be brought into court to testify.
VoLa. XKIII.-73

